















   




WORKING IN THE PROFIT VERSUS NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
SECTOR: WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?  















JEL Classification: J3, I3 





Please cite this paper as: Becchetti L., Castriota S. and Depedri S. (2010) Working in the 
profit versus non-for-profit sector: what difference does it make? An inquiry of preferences 
of voluntary and involuntary movers, 
Euricse Working Papers, N. 005 | 10 
   2 
Working in the profit versus not-for-profit sector: what difference 















We  investigate  what  is  behind  the  profit/not–for-profit  wage  differential  by 
comparing  judgments  on  job  characteristics  of  workers  who  voluntarily  or 
involuntarily moved from the former to the latter. We define voluntary movers as 
those who applied for a job in a not-for-profit organization and, when successful, 
resigned from their for profit position, while involuntary movers can either have 
been laid off by the company or have resigned without already having a job offer in 
the  not-for-profit  sector  when  leaving  the  firm.  We  observe  that  almost  half  of 
voluntary movers end up without higher  wages, but with higher job satisfaction 
after  the  change.  A  vast  majority  of  them  exhibit  significantly  higher  time 
flexibility,  improved  relationships  with  stakeholders,  closer  consistency  with 
educational skills and higher satisfaction of intrinsic motivations in the new job. 
Our findings support the profit/no profit compensating differential hypothesis and 
shed light on mechanisms which are beyond the donative behaviour of intrinsically 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the main research dimensions on which the literature compares profit and 
not-for-profit
2 sectors is that of wage differentials. Among different theories  trying 
to explain  such differentials, the donative  labour  hypothesis  (Hansmann, 1980; 
Preston, 1989; Rose-Ackerman, 1996 and Frank, 1996) predicts that not-for-profit 
wages are relatively lower in exchange of the higher non pecuniary compensations 
provided.  Starting  from  the  assumption  of  heterogeneity  in  workers‟ 
characteristics, this strand of the literature argues that some workers have higher 
intrinsic motivations (Handy and Katz, 1998; Mirvis, 1992), are altruistic and more 
willing to pay for public goods (Leete, 2000) and accept lower wages in exchange 
for  a  stronger consistency  between the  goals  of  not-for-profit  organizations  and 
their  moral  motivations  (Sen,  1985).  As  a  result  of  this  sorting  and  matching 
mechanism, the two sectors end up with different wages and heterogeneous sets 
of (more or less intrinsically motivated) workers (Borzaga and Depedri, 2005).  
 
From the empirical point of view, several contributions investigating the profit/not-
for-profit  wage  differential  find  evidence  consistent  with  the  donative  labour 
hypothesis.  Among  them,  Weisbrod  (1983)  observes  a  significant  negative  non 
profit wage gap looking at lawyers working in the profit and in the not-for-profit 
industry. Similar results are found by Preston (1989) for different types of white 
collar workers (managers, professionals, clerical and sales workers). Evidence from 
Europe seems to go in the same direction (Mosca et al., 2007, for Italy and Narcy, 
2009, for France). 
 
However,  in  a  thorough  empirical  analysis  on  US  Census  data,  Leete  (2001) 
demonstrates  that,  when  finer  controls  at  industry  and  occupation  level  are 
introduced in the analysis, the not-for-profit negative wage gap is evident only in a 
few cases. To account for the puzzle, Leete (2001) comments that “the pattern of 
nonprofit  wage  differentials  across  disaggregated  occupations  and  industries  is 
suggestive  of  a  number  of  forces  affecting  nonprofit  wages  simultaneously”  (p. 
138). 
 
The  main  problem  highlighted  by  this  literature  is  that  the  profit/not-for-profit 
wage  differential  may  be  determined  by  many  other  factors  ranging  from  job 
amenities,
3  disamenities
4  and  better  matching  betwe en  worker  and  job 
characteristics
5 (i.e. productivity differentials between the two sectors, a mismatch 
between industry specific vacancies and workers ‟ skills, etc.). As a consequence, 
the empirical literature cannot disentangle the role of different factors contributing 
to determine the profit/not-for-profit wage differential.
6  
                                                 
2  We  prefer  to  use  the  term  not-for-profit  instead  of  nonprofit  since  it  better  illustrates  the  nature  of  firms  that  do  not 
necessarily have a statutory constraint which prevents them from obtaining profit, but are better characterized by their goal not 
being oriented to profit maximization. 
3  Among them the literature emphasizes job security (Sousa -Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2000; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999; 
Bryson, Cappellari and Lucifora, 2005), having an interesting job (Clark, 2005), the level of involvement (Soohne, 2002), soci al 
relatedness (Clark, 1997; Borzaga and Depedri, 2005), and the size of enterprises (Schwochau, 1987; Miller, 1990). 
4 Examples are situations in which the effort required exceeds the tolerable level, the job is excessively physically or cognitively 
demanding, phenomena of burn -out emerge or there are controls and restrictions to autonomy and on -the-job flexibility 
emerge. 
5 Examples on the importance of the matching between job and worker characteristics are in Mortensen (1978) and Miller 
(1984) claiming that turn-over of employees emerge in the long run when employees reveal higher or lower abilities than 
expected in the selection process. A need for matching also emerges when considering intrinsic aspects, such as relationships, 
since extroverted people tend to be selected into jobs requiring more intensive relationships (Krueger and Schkade, 2007). 
6 Preston (1988) emphasizes that  not-for-profit managers are not accountable to shareholders and therefore may be more 
tempted to waste their cash flows. His hypothesis would imply a wage differential in the opposite direction with respect to t he 
donative labour hypothesis.  More in general, the  not-for-profit  sector is generally much more dependent on government  
funding and dependence from the public sector may either push wages upward (when the not-for-profit industry is heavily   4 
 
To understand our reasoning in a dynamic perspective, consider that an existing 
wage differential between profit and not-for-profit industry in the presence of job 
vacancies in the profit industry (and absence of productivity differentials) should be 
bridged by migration of workers from the latter to the former. One explanation by 
which this may not occur is that higher utility due to job characteristics (or to the 
favourable matching of job and worker characteristics) in the not-for-profit industry 
can compensate for the wage difference.
7  
 
The argument developed in this paper is that we can  instead  disentangle the 
specific role of relative amenities and disamenities in the two different sectors by i) 
inspecting relative preferences and comparative judgments on working conditions 
of voluntary and involuntary movers from the profit to the  not-for-profit industry 
and  ii)  identifying  (and  analyzing  the  characteristics  of)  a  smaller  gr oup  of 
voluntary movers who end up with non higher wage s and higher life satisfaction 
after the move.  
 
To  perform  our empirical anal ysis we  identify three groups. The first includes 
individuals who were laid off in the profit sector and found a new job in the not-for-
profit sector. We call them “laid off involuntary movers” (LOIMs). The second group 
includes individuals who resigned from their job in the for profit industry without 
having already decided to seek a job in the not-for-profit industry. We name them 
“resigned involuntary movers” (RIMs).
8 The third group is made up of workers who 
voluntarily  left  the  for  profit  sector  for  a  job  in  the  not-for-profit  industry 
(“voluntary movers” or VMs).  
 
Within this third group of VMs we further identify a fourth group made up of the 
subset of voluntary movers who register higher job satisfaction in spite of a non 
higher wage. We call them “non wage motivated voluntary movers” (NWMVMs) and 
focus  on  these  workers  to  investigate  whether  compensating  non  pecuniary 
characteristics and/or higher intrinsic motivations may explain this paradox. The 
paper  is  divided  into  six  sections  (including  introduction  and  conclusions).  The 
second section illustrates the assumptions underlying our model. The third section 
describes the dataset, while the fourth and fifth sections provide descriptive and 
econometric findings respectively. The sixth section concludes the paper. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider an economy populated by workers (indexed with i) and jobs (indexed with 
k)  where  workers‟  utility  function  is  Ui=f(Ci,  Ri,  JAk,  JDk,  IMik)  depending  on 
consumption (Ci), recreational leisure (Ri) amenities and disamenities of their job 
(JAk  and  JDk  respectively)  and  worker‟s  intrinsic  motivations  (IMik).  Intrinsic 
motivations
9  are,  in turn,  a  function of the  closeness  of worker‟s  ideals  (WI)  to 
                                                                                                                                                            
subsidised) or downward (when governments with increasingly severe budget constraints impose minimum price competitions 
without quality floors in procurement rules).  
7 This statement has been supported by empirical analyses investigating the determinants of job satisfaction. Analyses show 
that the worker utility depends upon factors other than pay and that for employees in non-profit organizations, these factors are 
more important than in other organizations, as demonstrated by macro -panel studies by Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000), 
Skalli et al. (2007), and Clark (1997). Examples of matching in nonprofit organizations are those where particular importance is 
placed by both organizations and employees to the social usefulness of the job (e.g., Borzaga and Tortia, 2006) and similarly that 
policies of fairness match the tendency to cooperation of workers (Benz, 2005; Valentini, 2005; Tortia, 2008). 
8 Workers in this group voluntarily abandoned the job in the for profit sector without the willingness to enter the  not-for-profit 
sector. We therefore define them as involuntary, making reference to the fact that not all of the two decisions needed to produce 
a move from the profit to the not-for-profit sector were voluntary.  
9 The original definition of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975) states that : one is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an 
activity when he receives no apparent reward except the activity itself. Prendergast (2007)  applies the concept when   5 
corporate  goals  (CG),  that  is  IMij=g(WIi,CGj).  The  labour  demand  is  standard 
Ld=h(w,  MPL)  and  is  a  function  of  wages  (w)  and  the  marginal  productivity  of 
labour (MPL). Workers face a standard constraint  wL M pC wR  where  L is the 
total number of hours that can be worked in a day and  M  is non labour income. By 
solving the constrained maximization problem we get labour supply as a function of 
prices, wage, job amenities and disamenities and the individual specific weight of 
intrinsic motivations in the utility function: Lsi =k (P, w, JAj, JDj, IMij).  
 
Imagine two types of workers with low or high intrinsic motivation (i=L, H) and two 
types  of  profit  and  not-for-profit  industries  (j=π,  nπ).  To  justify  an  initial  wage 
differential in favour of the for profit industry assume that productivity is higher in 
the for profit industry: Yπ=h(AL,K) > Ynπ=h(L,K) with A being a labour augmenting 
component which is present in the for profit, but not in the not-for-profit industry. 
By contrast, assume that working in the not-for-profit sector provides greater job 
amenities (e.g., time flexibility, relationship with colleagues, and involvement) and 
lower job disamenities (e.g., control); more formally, JAπ<JAnπ and JDπ>JDnπ. The 
effect of job amenities and disamenities is assumed to be job specific but identical 
for  both  groups  of workers  (i.e.  the  two  arguments  enter  the  utility  function  of 
different individuals in the same way). In absence of intrinsic motivations, labour 
demand is higher in the for profit than in the not-for-profit industry, workers move 
to the for profit sector up to a point where marginal productivity of labour is such 
that  the  remaining  wage  difference  is  compensated  by  the  difference  in  job 
disamenities. 
 
If we add that the not-for-profit industry reduces the gap between workers‟ ideals 
and corporate goals (IMπ<IMnπ) we obtain a leftward shift in the supply of labour in 
the  not-for-profit  industry  and  a  higher  wage  differential  in  equilibrium.  In 
equilibrium, we have that (Wπ-Wnπ)=f(A, IMij, JAj, JDj). Consequently, the wage 
differential  between the  profit and  not-for-profit  industry  depends  on the  labour 
augmenting component, on the intrinsic motivations, and on the job amenities and 
disamenities.  In  this  model  we  can  observe  workers  whose  level  of  intrinsic 
motivations  in their  specific  job (IMij)  is such  that  Ui=f(Ci,Ri (wπ),JAπ,JDπ,  IMiπ)< 
Ui=f(Ci,Ri (wnπ),JAnπ,JDnπ, IMinπ) even though wπ>wnπ.
10 Imagine that both industries 
are at full employment and that new job opportunities are opened in the  not-for-
profit industries. We therefore should see such workers move from the profit to the 
not profit industry, become happier as a result of the change and be characterised 
by a high level of satisfaction of intrinsic motivations. 
 
Our empirical analysis will start by analyzing comparative evaluations of past and 
new jobs for involuntary and voluntary movers from the profit to the not-for-profit 
industry  and  will  follow  with  a  direct  test  on  the  conclusion  of  this  simple 
theoretical example. The null hypothesis will be that higher satisfaction of intrinsic 
motivations in the new job  raise the possibility that a worker voluntarily moves 




                                                                                                                                                            
interpreting the working effort of bureaucrats who have weak monetary incentives but nonetheless perform their jobs because 
they care about the outcomes.  
10 Such workers may have ended up in the for profit industry for lack of vacancies in the not-for-profit industry.   6 
3. The database and the sample 
 
Our  empirical  analysis  relies  on  a  dataset  (ICSI  2007)  created  by  a  pool  of six 
universities
11 in 2006 with questionnaires submitted to a representative sample of 
4,134  employees  and  338  managers  of  320  Italian  cooperatives.  The  Survey 
includes information on socio-demographic controls (age, gender, education, etc.), 
job characteristics (wage, tasks, working hours, overtime) and job satisfaction with 
respect to a number of possible domains (with colleagues, wage, type of job). 
  
The sample of institutions is extracted from the ISTAT (Italian National Agency for 
Statistics)  2003  census  on  social  enterprises  (for  a  definition  see  the  section 
below), recording 6,168 active cooperatives (with at least one employee) at the 
national level (Carpita, 2009). The initial sample i s stratified by cooperative type 
(type A and t ype B)
12, provincial  level (the Italian state is composed by 107 
provinces), and by size, considering the standard definitions of small, medium and 
large firms (under 15, between 15 and 50, and over 50 employees).  In principle, 
the final sample should have included  411 organisations. However, of these, 186 
organisations (45.3% of the total) agreed to participate in the study, 164 (39.9% 
of the sample) declined, while 61 organisations (14.8%) did not reply. For firms in 
the below 15 employee class, all workers were interviewed, while in medium and 
large size classes a sample of potential respondents was randomly extracted in 
each  firm.  2,883  questionnaires  were  administered  to  employees  in  the  186 
organisations  that  agreed  to  participate.  Due  to  nonresponses,
13  2,419 
questionnaires were finally compiled by selected respondents.  
 
To compensate for  nonresponses  and to integrate the survey in order to meet 
stratification criteria,  134 organisations were added to the initial sample.  Such 
organisations were chosen through personal contacts on the basis of the affinity 
with the non-participating cooperatives following the three criteria chosen for the 
stratification of the sample. The same methodology was  adopted when extracting 
the sample of paid employees in each organisation.   Therefore, the final sample 
available for the empirical analysis, which hereafter will be named ICSI 2007, is 
made  up  of  320  organisations  and  4,134  questionnaires  compiled  by  paid 
employees.
14  Summary statistics of variables considered in the descriptive  and 
econometric analysis which follows are provided in Table 1. As we can see, there is 
a prevalence of female and young workers. The average numbers of years in the 
cooperative is 6 and a large majority of workers are also cooperative members. 
 
3.1 Cooperative features and the not-for-profit industry 
 
In Italy, not-for-profit organisations producing goods and services mainly choose 
the cooperative legal form of ownership. Italian cooperatives differ from for profit 
firms  because  the  former  do  not  have  the  profit  maximising  goal  but  rather, 
statutorily,  that  of  creating  benefits  not  under  the  prevailing  form  of  profits  for 
some  of  their  stakeholders.
15  Within  the cooperative family,  social  cooperatives 
                                                 
11 Trento, Bergamo, Brescia, Milano Bicocca, Napoli and Reggio Calabria. 
12 For details on characteristics of the two different types of cooperatives see section 3.1. 
13 The rate of nonresponses was extremely low. 85 percent of involved respondents answered on average 90 percent of the 87 
questions (56 single choice questions and 31 multiple choice questions) enclosed in the questionnaire. 
14 The distortion of the ICSI sample relative to the ISTAT sample is limited, since it amounts to an increased presence of 
cooperatives located in Northern Italy relative to the cooperatives located in Southern Ital y, and a stronger presence of bigger 
cooperatives than in the initial sample. For a more precise account of the differences between the ISTAT 2005 sample and the 
ICSI 2007 sample the reader can consult Carpita (2009, Chapter 1, pp. 1-36). 
15 The two traditional forms are workers cooperatives (workers are the dominant stakeholders and benefits are attributed to 
them  in  the  form  of  safer  working  conditions  and/or  access  to  profits)  and  consumers’  cooperatives  (consumers  are  the 
dominant stakeholders and benefits are attributed to them in the form of lower prices and higher quality of goods.   7 
(cooperative  sociali)  are  a  recently  born  new  legal  form,  pursuing  the  goal  of 
providing a social service to beneficiaries different from their shareholders.
16  
 
Italian law  381/1991 establishes that the goal s  of social cooperatives  are  social 
work integration of disadvantaged subjects, community wellbeing and promotion of 
the human being. Social cooperatives can be characterised as either type A when 
they  manage  healthcare  and  education  services,  or  type  B  (also  called  work 
integration social enterprises) when they operate in industry, agriculture, trade or 
service sectors with the goal of inclusion of “disadvantaged” workers (at least 30 
percent of the workforce must be disabled, ex-offenders, ex-drug addicted, etc.). 
With regard to the destination of the economic value created, Italian cooperatives 
are  obliged  by  law  to  allocate  at  least  30%  of  their  net  surpluses  to  indivisible 
reserves  of  capital  (riserva  legale).
17  After  satisfying  this  obligation  they  can, 
though they are not obliged to, distribute only a limited part of their surpluses in 
the form of either remuneration and re-evaluation of members‟ capital shares or in 
return for members‟ contributions (ristorni).
18 The usual practice for cooperatives is 
to  reinvest  all  of  the  realised  net  surpluses  in  indivisible  reserves.   For  these 
reasons, Italian cooperatives can be considered (almost completely) not -for-profit 
firms. 
This is even more so for social cooperatives (those under our scrutiny) which have 
additional characteristics that justify their classification among not-for-profit firms. 
First, they must declare in their statute the public-benefit aim for which they have 
been created. Second,  under  law 381/199, they  are able  to implement multi -
stakeholder governance, since more than one group of patrons (e.g. volunteer 




4. Descriptive findings 
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of our sample. It shows that interviewed social 
cooperative workers are relatively young (37 years old on average), a large part of 
which are females (74 percent - this sample proportion coincides with that of the 
universe  of  social  cooperative  workers)  and  members  of  the  cooperative  (76 
percent).  The  majority  of  workers  conceive  their  job  as  not  just  a  “mere 
contractual relationship where job performance is exchanged for pay” but rather 
see  in  it  additional  motivations  related  to  personal  development,  quality  of 
relationships and a shared social purpose with the cooperative. 
 
                                                 
16 Social cooperatives differ from not-for-profits with a prevalent distributive function (e.g., foundations) or those supplying 
services to a restricted group of beneficiaries (e.g., in associations). 
17 These reserves cannot be appropriated by members even if the firm shuts down its operations. In this case, the residual value 
of the reserves is to be conferred to a common national fund used to finance the start -up of new cooperatives, following the 
principle of enlarged mutuality. 
18 In worker cooperatives the  ristorni are represented by end-of-the-year increases in labour remuneration calculated as a 
percentage of the wages distributed during the accounting year (up to 30%). In consumer cooperatives the ristorni are usually 
represented  by  end-of-the-year  bonuses  valid  for  the  purchase  of  products  sold  by  the  cooperative  and  calculated  as  a 
percentage of the total amount of products bought during the accouting year. 
19 The multi-stakeholder governance is not compulsory as it happens, for example, in French  cooperatives de solidarieté sociale. 
However, recent data (Depedri, 2008) reveal that most social cooperatives do indeed include among their active stakeholders 
more than one group of patrons.    8 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the full sample 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Male  4,082  0.26  0.44  0  1 
Age  3,986  37.38  9.02  17  73 
Education  3,759  12.93  3.35  0  21 
Italian  4,134  0.95  0.22  0  1 
Member  4,134  0.76  0.43  0  1 
Years in coop  3,905  6.21  4.89  0  36 
Permanent  4,134  0.80  0.40  0  1 
Full-time  4,063  0.56  0.50  0  1 
Medium coop  4,134  0.32  0.46  0  1 
Large coop  4,134  0.43  0.50  0  1 
Type A  4,134  0.78  0.41  0  1 
North-West  4,134  0.40  0.49  0  1 
North-East  4,134  0.22  0.41  0  1 
Centre  4,134  0.22  0.41  0  1 
Description of the job in the cooperative * 
a mere contractual relationship where job 
performance is exchanged for pay  3,457  2.55  1.91  1  7 
the participation in the achievement of a 
common goal  3,564  5.20  1.57  1  7 
a mix between job and growth in personal 
development  3,554  5.45  1.48  1  7 
a set of relationships which go beyond mere 
job relationships  3,494  4.91  1.75  1  7 
a social engagement common to the 
respondent and the cooperative  3,556  5.31  1.61  1  7 
* 1 to 7 Likert scale ranging from much worse (1) to much better (7) with 4 indicating 
equal conditions between previous and new job 
 
A first important question is about the magnitude of our three groups of movers in the 
overall  sample.  The  subsample  of  social  cooperative  workers  who  were  previously 
employed  in  the  for  profit  industry  is  made  up  of  1,442  individuals  (that  is,  34.69 
percent  of  the  total  sample).  Among  them,  voluntary  movers  number  419  (10.08 
percent of the total sample) while laid off and resigned movers number 423 (10.18 
percent) and 521 (12.73 percent) respectively. Note that the sum of the three groups 
does  not  exactly  coincide  with  the  total  number  of  workers  who  moved  from  one 
industry to another because a small residual group declares to have moved for other, 
non-specified  reasons.  Table  2  shows  that  demographic  characteristics  of  the  four 
considered groups of movers are not too different, even though the share of males is 
much higher among voluntary than among involuntary movers. 
 
In the rest of our descriptive and econometric analysis we will often compare values for 
these three groups of shifters from the profit to not-for-profit industry with another 
group  of  workers  (defined  as  „the  rest  of  the  sample‟),  which  is  represented  by 
individuals who change from a previous to a current position within the same not-for-
profit sector (while workers who come from unemployment or inactivity are obviously 
excluded  from  the  analysis  which  follows).  Consider  that,  under  reasonable 
assumptions, when evaluating comparative differences between the two industries it is 
exactly the same if the benchmark is made up of individuals with previous and new 
jobs in the not-for-profit industry or individuals with previous and new jobs in the for 
profit industry.
20 
                                                 
20 Assume, in fact, the case in which a given characteristic (i.e. time flexibility) is higher in the not-for-profit than in the for profit 
industry. Individuals changing from the profit to the profit (or from the not-for-profit to the not-for-profit) will register no 
signifiant  change  in  time  flexibility.  On  the  other  hand,  shifters  from  one  industry  to  the  other  will  register  a  significant 
difference and therefore will report a significantly different comparative judgement when compared with each of the two 
benchmarks. Table 2: Summary statistics by subsample 
     NWMVM    VM    LOIM    RIM    Rest 
Variable    Obs  Mean  S.D.    Obs  Mean  S.D.    Obs  Mean  S.D.    Obs  Mean  S.D.    Obs  Mean  S.D. 
Male   
177  0.41  0.49    416  0.37  0.48    418  0.28  0.45    517  0.33  0.47   
2,652  0.22  0.41 
Age   
172  39.13  8.39    403  38.78  8.95    413  39.30  8.79    502  38.56  8.53   
2,592  36.51  9.06 
Education   
155  13.36  3.18    372  13.11  3.47    387  12.91  3.17    474  13.01  3.30   
2,450  12.90  3.38 
Italian   
179  0.96  0.19    419  0.95  0.21    423  0.94  0.24    521  0.95  0.21   
2,692  0.95  0.21 
Member   
179  0.85  0.35    419  0.83  0.38    423  0.73  0.45    521  0.75  0.43   
2,692  0.75  0.43 
Years in coop   
167  7.07  4.97    398  7.12  5.12    406  6.13  4.68    500  6.09  4.63   
2,529  6.09  4.92 
Permanent   
179  0.91  0.29    419  0.89  0.32    423  0.83  0.38    521  0.83  0.38   
2,692  0.78  0.41 
Full-time   
178  0.70  0.46    413  0.71  0.45    418  0.54  0.50    516  0.58  0.49   
2,638  0.54  0.50 
Medium coop   
179  0.35  0.48    419  0.32  0.47    423  0.30  0.46    521  0.32  0.47   
2,692  0.31  0.46 
Large coop   
179  0.45  0.50    419  0.47  0.50    423  0.41  0.49    521  0.49  0.50   
2,692  0.42  0.49 
Type A   
179  0.71  0.46    419  0.72  0.45    423  0.60  0.49    521  0.70  0.46   
2,692  0.84  0.37 
North-West    
179  0.49  0.50    419  0.43  0.50    423  0.42  0.49    521  0.46  0.50   
2,692  0.39  0.49 
North-East   
179  0.28  0.45    419  0.24  0.43    423  0.20  0.40    521  0.25  0.44   
2,692  0.21  0.41 
Centre    
179  0.16  0.37     419  0.21  0.41     423  0.24  0.43     521  0.19  0.39    
2,692  0.22  0.41 
 
Legend: LOIMs=laid off involuntary movers; RIMs=resigned involuntary movers; VMs=voluntary movers; NWMVMs=non wage motivated 
voluntary movers; Rest=rest of the sample   10 
Table 3: Summary statistics on characteristics of new (not-for-profit) job versus previous (for profit) job by subsamples of 
movers 
     NWMVMs    VMs    RIMs    LOIMs 
Variable    Mean  [95%  C.I.]    Mean  [95%  C.I.]    Mean  [95%  C.I.]    Mean  [95%  C.I.] 
Worse wage and economic rewards    1.00  1.00  1.00    0.33  0.28  0.37    0.44  0.40  0.49    0.37  0.33  0.42 
Better consistency with education    0.69  0.63  0.77    0.71  0.67  0.76    0.63  0.59  0.67    0.60  0.55  0.65 
More responsibilities    0.68  0.58  0.72    0.69  0.65  0.74    0.66  0.61  0.70    0.64  0.59  0.69 
Improved time flexibility    0.71  0.65  0.78    0.69  0.65  0.74    0.72  0.68  0.76    0.72  0.68  0.76 
Improved career perspective    0.43  0.36  0.50    0.50  0.45  0.55    0.44  0.40  0.48    0.43  0.38  0.48 
Improved job stability    0.39  0.32  0.46    0.53  0.48  0.58    0.50  0.45  0.54    0.66  0.61  0.71 
More involvement in decision-
making    0.64  0.57  0.71    0.62  0.57  0.67    0.54  0.50  0.59    0.54  0.49  0.59 
Better relationships with colleagues    0.66  0.60  0.73    0.66  0.61  0.70    0.65  0.60  0.69    0.64  0.59  0.68 
Better relationships with superiors    0.67  0.60  0.74    0.66  0.61  0.70    0.69  0.65  0.73    0.68  0.64  0.73 
Higher possibility of creating new 
relationships  0.80  0.75  0.86    0.78  0.74  0.82    0.74  0.70  0.78    0.70  0.66  0.75 
Higher job satisfaction      1.00  1.00  1.00     0.88  0.85  0.91     0.81  0.78  0.84     0.78  0.74  0.82 
 
 
Legend: LOIMs=laid off involuntary movers; RIMs=resigned involuntary movers; VMs=voluntary movers; NWMVMs=non wage motivated 
voluntary movers 
  
 When we look in Table 3 at the wage differential in the three categories, we find that 
more than half of them claim to end up with a wage which is not higher than in the 
previous job.
21 This occurs for 45 percent of voluntary movers, 37 percent of resigned 
involuntary movers and 40 percent of laid off involuntary movers. If we consider that 
moving from one job to another entails some transaction costs,  then non pecuniary 
motivations and/or intrinsic motivations must explain why 45 percent of voluntary 
movers have made this choice.
22 
 
We therefore investigate  in Table 3  the comparative evaluations of previo us and 
current jobs of voluntary and involuntary movers. The question under scrutiny (48 in 
the questionnaire) is the following: 
  
With respect to your previous job, how do you think your job condition has changed 
with  respect  to:  i)  consistency  with  your  education;  ii)  responsibilities;  iii)  time 
flexibility; iv) career perspectives; v) job stability; vi) involvement in decision-making; 
vii) relationships with colleagues; viii) relationships with superiors; ix) possibility of 
creating new relationships (with stakeholders). 
 
Answers are given on a 1 to 7 Likert scale ranging from much worse (1) to much 
better (7) with 4  indicating equal conditions between  the previous and new job. A 
general consideration is that for all groups an improvement on the different modalities 
is  registered  for  the  majority  of  movers  (including  involuntary  ones).  Looking  in 
greater  detail  at  descriptive  findings  on  this  question  we  find  that  the  majority  of 
movers  (especially  voluntary  ones)  from  profit  to  no  profit  industries  find  more 
consistency  with  their  education  in  the  job  change.  More  specifically,  this  result  is 
found for 71 percent of voluntary movers, 63 percent of resigned and 60 percent of 
laid-off involuntary movers (Table 3).  
 
Differences in terms of responsibility on the job do not seem to be too strong, but, 
again, voluntary movers register a positive difference between their new and past job 
in higher proportion than the rest of the sample. The difference between the three 
categories of movers and the rest of the sample is strong in terms of time flexibility, 
with  the  latter  being  higher  in  the  new  not-for-profit  occupation.  Here  laid-off 
involuntary  movers  are  those  reporting  the  higher  share  of  positive  responses  (72 
percent)  against  65  percent  of  those  not  moving  from  the  profit  to  the  non  profit 
industry.  A  strong  result  emerging  from  descriptive  findings  is  that  88  percent  of 
voluntary  movers  increase  their  job  satisfaction  with  the  change.  The  share  of 
(resigned  or laid  off)  involuntary  movers  finding  higher  job satisfaction  in the  new 
not-for-profit job is also far above the average (81 and 78 percent respectively). 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics on non wage motivated voluntary movers 
 
Beyond these general statistics on the three groups we are particularly interested in 
the subgroup of non wage motivated voluntary movers (NWMVMs), that is, individuals 
who moved voluntarily from the profit to the not-for-profit industry finding non higher 
wages and higher job satisfaction. If we consider that transaction costs of changing 
jobs  must  be  nonzero,  the  experienced  increase  in  job  satisfaction  cannot  be 
generated by pecuniary reasons. This group is not small since it amounts to around 
                                                 
21 The data does refer to a self-estimation of workers interviewed and not to a comparison of observed wages. Specifically, workers 
were  asked  if  their  economic  treatment  is  ameliorated  or  not  in  moving  from  the  previous  job  to  the  employment  in  the 
cooperative (see question d47_1 in the questionnaire). 
22 Unfortunately, it is impossible to know whether they anticipate d future expected layoffs, which may bring some pecuniary 
motivations back into the foreground.     12 
43 percent of all voluntary movers for a total of 179 individuals. To check which non 
pecuniary  compensating  differentials  may  more  than  offset  the  nonpositive  wage 
change in terms of work satisfaction we use information from question d47 described 
in the previous section (see data in Table 3).  
 
The only two domains in which there is no improvement for the majority of NWMVMs 
are career perspectives (43 percent) and job stability (39 percent),
23 that is, the two 
motivations which can be more easily linked with pecuniary variables (both of them 
affect the future expected stream of wages, if not the current wage, see Table 3). All 
other dimensions register an improvement for the majority of  NWMVMs. In the new 
job there is more consistency with one‟s own education (70 percent of respondents), 
higher  responsibilities  (65  percent),  more  time  flexibility  (71  percent),  more 
involvement in decision-making (64 percent), improved relationships with colleagues 
(66 percent) and with superiors (67 percent), and higher opportunities for creating 
new relationships with stakeholders (80 percent).  
 
5. Econometric findings 
 
In our econometric analysis we aim to test whether being part of one of the three 
groups of movers from the profit to the not-for-profit industry affects the comparative 
evaluation  of  characteristics  of  the  old  and  new  job.  We  therefore  estimate  the 
following ordered probit specification (see Table 4): 
 
i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
Center NorthWest NorthEast AType
e L Medium Fulltime Permanent Yearcoop Member
Italian Education Age Male VM RIM LOIM Y
17 16 15 14
13 12 11 10 9 8
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
arg     
(1)  
 
where the dependent variable of the comparative evaluation of the new versus the old 
job  (ΔY)  is  regressed  on  a  set  of  controls  including  a  gender  dummy  (Male), 
respondent‟s  age  (Age),  years  of  education  (Education),  a  dummy  for  Italian 
nationality (Italian), a dummy which takes a value of one if the respondent is also a 
member of the cooperative (Member), the number of years of work in the cooperative 
(Yearcoop),  two  dummies  for  permanent  and  full-time  job  status  (Permanent  and 
Fulltime respectively, the benchmark being temporary and part-time), two dummies 
for medium and large size (Medium and Large), a dummy which takes a value of one 
if  the  respondent  works  in  the  A-type  cooperative  (AType)  and  three  macroarea 
dummies  (NorthEast,  NorthWest  and  Centre).  Finally,  LOIM,  RIM  and  VM  are  the 
dummies  capturing  the  three  groups  of  movers  (laid  off  involuntary,  resigned 
involuntary and voluntary, respectively). As specified in section 4, the benchmark in 
this analysis is the group of individuals whose previous and current job was in the 
not-for-profit industry. 
 
Among  the  most  important  econometric  results  we  find  that  being  a  voluntary, 
resigned involuntary and laid off involuntary mover is associated, respectively, to a 7, 
13  and  11  percent  higher  probability  of  experiencing  a  wage  reduction  (Table  4, 
column 1). We also find that being a voluntary mover from the profit to the not-for-
profit industry raises the probability of declaring higher consistency with education in 
                                                 
23 This is an important point since it reduces the likelihood that voluntary movers are in reality moving because they anticipate bad 
perspectives (in terms of probability of remaining employed or career path) in the for profit job they leave.     13 
the new job by 18 percent (Table 4, column 2).
24 The effect is 11 percent for laid off 
involuntary movers  and 9 percent for resigned involuntary movers .  Another strong 
effect is in the relative comparison on work time flexibility. Being a laid off or resigned 
involuntary mover raises the probability of increasing work  time flexibility in the job 
change by 11 percent (Table 4, column 4). Being a resigned involuntary movers raises 
the probability of declaring improved relationships in the new job, but this is not the 
case for laid off involuntary workers (Table 4, column 10). Finally, the voluntary and 
involuntary  mover  status  is  associated  with  declaration  of  higher  quality  of 
relationships with stakeholders in the new job (Table 4, column 10). 
 













VM  0.07  0.18  0.06  0.08  0.00 
  (2.27)  (5.89)  (1.89)  (2.57)  (0.07) 
RIM  0.13  0.11  0.05  0.11  0.01 
  (4.81)  (3.99)  (1.78)  (4.25)  (0.22) 
LOIM  0.11  0.09  0.04  0.11  0.00 
  (3.48)  (2.82)  (1.40)  (3.97)  (0.14) 
Male  0.06  0.01  0.02  -0.01  0.05 
  (2.53)  (0.26)  (1.03)  (-0.51)  (1.94) 
Age  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  (3.72)  (3.48)  (-7.75)  (-4.36)  (-7.54) 
Education  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (2.22)  (0.11)  (-0.35)  (-0.95)  (0.60) 
Italian  0.15  0.06  -0.03  0.02  -0.06 
  (3.20)  (1.16)  (-0.62)  (0.35)  (-1.29) 
Member  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.07 
  (0.18)  (0.06)  (2.26)  (0.42)  (2.65) 
Years in Coop  -0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
  (-3.81)  (4.87)  (7.08)  (4.26)  (4.42) 
Permanent  0.02  -0.05  -0.05  -0.01  -0.07 
  (0.66)  (-1.62)  (-1.74)  (-0.43)  (-2.20) 
Full time  -0.11  0.11  0.09  -0.02  0.15 
  (-5.42)  (5.07)  (4.17)  (-1.12)  (6.84) 
Medium Coop  0.06  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.02 
  (2.01)  (-0.12)  (0.05)  (-0.67)  (0.78) 
Large Coop  0.06  0.03  -0.01  -0.05  0.07 
  (2.28)  (1.09)  (-0.47)  (-1.85)  (2.45) 
Type A  0.00  0.15  0.04  0.01  -0.02 
  (0.15)  (5.51)  (1.46)  (0.53)  (-0.62) 
North-West  0.22  -0.09  -0.05  -0.02  -0.13 
  (5.75)  (-2.55)  (-1.45)  (-0.60)  (-3.78) 
North-East  0.27  -0.12  -0.03  0.00  -0.12 
  (6.33)  (-3.10)  (-0.73)  (0.03)  (-3.14) 
Centre  0.20  -0.08  -0.06  0.01  -0.12 
   (4.67)  (-2.10)  (-1.61)  (0.23)  (-3.14) 
N  2,346  2,315  2,313  2,329  2,305 
(Pseudo) R2  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.05 
Legend: LOIMs=laid off involuntary movers; RIMs=resigned involuntary movers; 
VMs=voluntary movers; NWMVMs=non wage motivated voluntary movers 
                                                 
24 The result here may be explained by an excess supply of workers graduated in non technical subjects, some of which accept a job 
in the for profit industry so as to not remain unemployed.   14 
 























VM  -0.04  0.02  0.02  -0.02  0.08  0.10 
  (-1.40)  (0.51)  (0.61)  (-0.50)  (2.88)  (3.98) 
RIM  -0.04  -0.01  0.05  0.05  0.09  0.05 
  (-1.19)  (-0.33)  (1.63)  (2.01)  (3.60)  (2.24) 
LOIM  0.12  -0.02  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.04 
  (3.71)  (-0.61)  (0.82)  (1.24)  (0.80)  (1.75) 
Male  -0.05  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.02  0.02 
  (-1.96)  (-0.07)  (-0.48)  (0.02)  (-0.68)  (0.92) 
Age  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
  (-4.70)  (-4.56)  (2.43)  (1.56)  (-4.25)  (2.90) 
Education  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.91)  (0.82)  (0.79)  (1.06)  (1.39)  (1.09) 
Italian  -0.13  0.00  0.07  -0.06  0.04  0.02 
  (-2.56)  (-0.05)  (1.43)  (-1.25)  (0.81)  (0.53) 
Member  0.03  0.07  0.01  -0.02  0.00  0.01 
  (1.10)  (2.46)  (0.25)  (-0.89)  (0.08)  (0.25) 
Years in Coop  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
  (4.16)  (7.44)  (4.36)  (3.46)  (4.61)  (3.68) 
Permanent  0.12  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.08  -0.01 
  (4.00)  (-0.70)  (-0.44)  (-0.04)  (-3.09)  (-0.39) 
Full time  0.12  0.13  0.11  0.09  0.08  0.08 
  (5.35)  (5.66)  (4.92)  (4.27)  (3.66)  (4.20) 
Medium Coop  0.03  -0.05  -0.03  -0.05  0.01  0.03 
  (1.12)  (-1.80)  (-1.08)  (-1.70)  (0.36)  (1.17) 
Large Coop  0.06  -0.11  -0.05  -0.04  0.02  0.01 
  (2.13)  (-3.85)  (-1.83)  (-1.43)  (0.66)  (0.22) 
Type A  -0.08  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.08 
  (-2.86)  (2.55)  (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.44)  (3.47) 
North-West  -0.19  -0.06  -0.03  -0.05  -0.05  0.02 
  (-5.28)  (-1.65)  (-0.83)  (-1.38)  (-1.61)  (0.88) 
North-East  -0.22  -0.03  0.00  -0.01  -0.04  0.04 
  (-5.62)  (-0.83)  (0.10)  (-0.32)  (-1.04)  (1.29) 
Centre  -0.15  -0.08  -0.06  -0.10  -0.05  0.00 
   (-3.73)  (-2.11)  (-1.47)  (-2.56)  (-1.44)  (0.01) 
N  2,321  2,310  2,323  2,353  2,324  2,351 
(Pseudo) R2  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04 
Legend: LOIMs=laid off involuntary movers; RIMs=resigned involuntary movers; 
VMs=voluntary movers; NWMVMs=non wage motivated voluntary movers 
 
 
A final important finding is that being part of the three groups of movers significantly 
affects the probability of being happier in the job change (Table 4, column 11). The 
effect is 9 percent for voluntary movers, 5 percent for resigned involuntary movers 
and 4 percent for laid-off involuntary movers. The fact that the effect is not confined 
to voluntary movers is relevant and less expected.  
 
   15 
5.1 Econometric findings on non wage motivated voluntary movers 
 
In  order  to  identify  characteristics  of  non  wage  motivated  voluntary  movers  (the 
subgroup of voluntary movers who increased job satisfaction without moving to higher 
wages in the change) we estimate the following probit model (see Table 6):  
 
i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
PCIM Center
NorthEast AType e L Medium Fulltime Permanent
Yearcoop Member Italian Education Age Male NWMVM
14 13
12 11 10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0
arg (2) 
 
where the dependent variable takes a value of one if the individual  is a non wage 
motivated  voluntary  mover  (NWMVM)  who  experienced  higher  life  satisfaction and 
zero  otherwise.  Since  we  want  to  verify  whether  higher  intrinsic  motivations  are 
positively  correlated  with  the  NWMVM  status  among  movers  from  the  profit  to  the 
not-for-profit  sector,  we  exclude  from  the  regression  all  other  movers  (that  is, 
individuals  with  previous  and  current  jobs  in  the  not-for-profit  industry).  Equation 
regressors, specified as in (2), are similar to those in (1) with the addition of the PCIM 
variable  which  is  a  principal  component  of  the  variables  measuring  intrinsic 
motivations as specified below (see Table 5a and 5b). The inclusion of the intrinsic 
motivation  variables  stems  from  the  considerati on  that  differences  in  intrinsic 
motivations  may  be  an  important  explanation  of  profit/not-for-profit  compensating 
wage  differentials  under  the  assumption  that  not-for-profit  firms  for  the  specific 
nature of their activities may satisfy them better.  
 
Table 5a: Principal component analysis (PCA) 
Component  Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
Comp. 1  2.73  1.41  0.39  0.39 
Comp. 2  1.32  0.55  0.19  0.58 
Comp. 3  0.77  0.14  0.11  0.69 
Comp. 4  0.63  0.04  0.09  0.78 
Comp. 5  0.59  0.1  0.08  0.86 
Comp. 6  0.49  0.03  0.07  0.93 
Comp. 7  0.46  .  0.07  1 
 
Table 5b: Principal components 
Variable 
Comp. 
1  Comp. 2  Comp. 3  Comp. 4  Comp. 5  Comp. 6  Comp. 7  Unexplained 
D8.1  -0.37  0.16  0.66  0.55  0.3  0  0.07  0 
D8.2  0.37  -0.2  0.72  -0.35  -0.36  0.21  -0.14  0 
D8.3  0.45  -0.14  0  0.52  -0.32  -0.64  -0.04  0 
D8.4  0.44  -0.22  -0.17  0.49  0.19  0.66  -0.16  0 
D8.5  0.44  -0.14  0.12  -0.24  0.71  -0.24  0.38  0 
D55.2  0.26  0.66  0.02  -0.09  0.24  -0.12  -0.65  0 
D55.3  0.27  0.65  0  0.07  -0.27  0.21  0.62  0 
Source: Becchetti, Castriota and Tortia (2010). 
 
A measure of intrinsic motivation in our Survey can be derived by analysing responses 
to question 8 where respondents are asked to provide their degree of consensus (on a 
1 to 7 Likert scale). The question under scrutiny is the following: 
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Do  you  think  that  your  job  relationship  with  the  cooperative  is:  (i)  a  mere 
contractual relationship where job is exchanged for pay (d8.1); (ii) a contribution 
which helps the cooperative to reach its goals (d8.2); (iii) a mix between job and 
growth in personal development (d8.3);(iv) a set of relationships which go beyond 
the  mere  job  relationships  (d8.4);  (v)  a  social  engagement  common  to  the 
respondent and the cooperative (d8.5).  
 
Our assumption is that high consent to the first item (d8.1) is negatively correlated, 
while consent with the other definitions (d8.2 to d8.5) is positively correlated with 
intrinsic  motivations.  A  deeper  scrutiny  of  the  five  statements  evidences  that  d8.3 
concerns  self-regarding  while  d8.2,  but  especially  d8.5,  other-regarding  intrinsic 
motivations.  This  is  because  agreement  with  statements  d8.2  to  d8.5  implies  that 
workers  find  in  their  job  a  source  of  satisfaction  (development,  identification  with 
cooperative goals, community and relational elements in the job, social engagement) 
which goes beyond mere remuneration. 
 
We find additional proxies of workers‟ intrinsic motivation by looking at the following 
question (52): asking whether,:  
 
Before finding the current job in the cooperative, were you looking for: (i) a job 
promoting your self-fulfilment (d52.3); (ii) a job allowing you to be helpful to other 
people (d52.2).  
 
A positive consent to these two statements clearly identifies that intrinsic motivations 
matter  and  remuneration  is  not  the  only  element  affecting  job  satisfaction  of  the 
respondent. We decided to use the first principal component of the items in the seven 
intrinsic  motivation  questions  because  we  considered  that  the  items  were  strictly 
correlated
25 and each of them captures only a specific facet of self or other -regarding 
intrinsic  motivations  (lack  of  non  monetary  motivations,  presence  of  intrinsic 
motivations related to development, identification with cooperative goals, community 
and relational elements in the job, social engagement, non monetary motivations 
measured before enterin g the cooperative). As a consequence, it  is advisable to 
transform  the  larger  number  of  correlated  variables  into  a  smaller  number  of 
uncorrelated ones revealing  the internal structure of the data in a way which best 
explains its variability.  
 
We therefore apply principal component analysis to the vector of the seven considered 
proxies.  Table 5a  documents the relevance of the first component which captures 
almost 40 percent of the variability. Said component is negatively correlated with the 
first items and positively correlated with all the others, with correlation coefficients 
which never fall below 25 percent (see Table 5b). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling  adequacy  (.76)  excludes  that  the  selected  variables  have  too  little  in 
common to warrant a factor analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
25 Many pairwise correlations are between .3 and .4 and the highest one (between d8.2 and d8.4) is .49. The correlation matrix  is 
omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.   17 
Table 6: Characteristics of movers from the profit to the not-for-profit industry 
  
        IV regression  
Regressor  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
Male  0.33  0.24  0.31  0.20  0.12  0.29 
  (2.10)  (1.02)  (0.58)  (2.09)  (0.91)  (1.07) 
Age  0.004  -0.04  -0.06  0.00  -0.03  -0.03 
  (0.71)  (-3.10)  (-1.81)  (-0.31)  (-3.31)  (-2.05) 
Education  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.02 
  (0.34)  (-0.02)  (0.46)  (0.41)  (0.00)  (0.52) 
Italian  0.73  0.63    0.37  0.33   
  (2.13)  (1.35)    (1.86)  (1.14)   
Member  0.14  0.20  1.04  0.01  0.01  0.43 
  (0.83)  (0.81)  (1.49)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (1.08) 
Years in Coop  -0.04  0.01  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.00 
  (-1.97)  (0.50)  (-0.32)  (-1.87)  (0.61)  (-0.14) 
Permanent  -0.15  0.06  0.00  -0.03  0.09  -0.04 
  (-0.71)  (0.19)  (-0.01)  (-0.28)  (0.47)  (-0.11) 
Full time  -0.31  0.14  0.87  -0.23  0.06  0.30 
  (-2.08)  (0.65)  (1.71)  (-2.66)  (0.46)  (0.90) 
Medium Coop  0.39  0.32  0.73  0.23  0.19  0.58 
  (1.97)  (1.10)  (1.00)  (1.93)  (1.15)  (1.31) 
Large Coop  0.19  0.29  0.37  0.14  0.22  0.51 
  (0.98)  (0.95)  (0.57)  (1.20)  (1.22)  (1.25) 
Type A  0.07  0.23  -0.20  -0.10  0.04  -0.20 
  (0.42)  (0.93)  (-0.33)  (-0.87)  (0.24)  (-0.57) 
North-West  0.99  0.41  0.62  0.61  0.19  0.31 
  (3.74)  (0.99)  (0.65)  (3.93)  (0.76)  (0.65) 
North-East  1.25  0.61  0.09  0.73  0.28  0.07 
  (4.36)  (1.37)  (0.09)  (4.22)  (1.08)  (0.15) 
Centre  0.77  0.26  0.62  0.49  0.14  0.40 
  (2.73)  (0.57)  (0.63)  (2.96)  (0.53)  (0.80) 
Comp. 1  0.09  0.42  0.63  0.33  0.40  0.60 
  (2.11)  (6.54)  (3.88)  (3.21)  (2.52)  (2.26) 
Constant  -2.20  1.09  1.55  -0.91  0.96  0.68 
   (-3.71)  (1.24)  (0.88)  (-2.19)  (1.69)  (0.72) 
N  899  527  141  899  527  141 
(Pseudo) R2  0.04  0.11  0.21       
Wald test of exogeneity χ2 







Log pseudolikelihood           -2,315  -1,314  -342 
 
Legend: the dependent variable is a dummy taking a value of one if the respondent is a non 
wage motivated voluntary mover (NWMVM). Regressions are as follows: i) probit regression on 
the sample of all movers from the profit to the not-for-profit industry; ii) probit regression on 
the sample of sample of movers from the profit to the not-for-profit industry with non higher 
wages in the new job; iii) probit regression on the sample of voluntary movers who ended up 
with  non  higher  wages;  iv)  IV  probit  correspondent  of  the  first  estimate;  v)  IV  probit 
correspondent of the second estimate; vi) IV probit correspondent of the third estimate. 
 
Estimate findings show that male gender and location in North-East, North-West or 
Centre positively affect the likelihood of being a NWMVM (Table 6, column 1).
26 The 
                                                 
26 A rationale for the geographical effect here may be that wages are higher than in the South (Becchetti and Castriota, 2010) and 
therefore there is more room for an acceptable reduction for the worker or that workers in the Northern regions have a higher 
level of social capital.   18 
effect of the inclusion of the first principal component of intrinsic motivation in the 
regression for the determinants of the NWMVM choice is positive and significant. This 
implies that the change from the for profit to the not-for-profit industry is positively 
correlated with intrinsic motivations or that the latter increase the likelihood of being 
part  of  the  NWMVM  group.  The  result  can  also  be  interpreted  as  showing  that 
NWMVMs  have  significantly  higher  intrinsic  motivations  than  other  movers.
27  If we 
assume that the  not-for-profit  sector is more able to satisfy the kind of intrinsic 
motivations indicated in section 5.1, these findings contribute to explain why, when 
moving to a non higher wage job, this specific group of workers ends up being happier 
than before: irrespective of the voluntary or involuntary cause of job change, higher 
intrinsic motivations are more likely to lead to a situation in which non higher wages 
may be associated with higher job satisfaction.  
 
A problem in this estimate, however, is that the dependent variable is  also zero for 
individuals who ended up with higher wages in the change. To tighten the estimate we 
limit the control sample  to only (voluntary and involuntary) changers who ended u p 
with non higher wages (Table 6, column 2). As a further robustness check we restrict 
the sample to only voluntary movers who ended up with non higher wages (excluding 
individuals from the other two groups   of involuntary movers   ending up with no n 
higher wages, see  Table 6, column 3). Again the variable of intrinsic motivations is 
strongly significant even though the number of observations is now limited to 189 
individuals. 
 
To rule out any possibility of reverse causality nexus we instrument (in all of the three 
previous estimates) the intrinsic motivation principal component with a dummy taking 
a value of one if the individual has never been a volunteer in the years before getting 
the new job. The decision to volunteer is expected to be strictly related to intrinsic 
motivations (individuals decide to work without monetary compensation as volunteers 
if they are intrinsically motivated) under the assumption that intrinsic motivations in 
the activity volunteered in the past are correlated with intrinsic motivations found in 
the current job. We propose two arguments for the validity of the instrument. First, 
there is no reverse causality between the dependent variable and the instrument since 
it is not possible that the higher satisfaction of moving from a profit to a no profit 
occupation with non higher wages causes the decision  to volunteer in the life period 
which precedes the new job.  Second, it is also difficult to imagine omitted variables , 
different from intrinsic motivations, which are correlated with both being part of the 
NWMVM group and having never volunteered in the past. Note that our IV estimate is 
exactly  specified,  which   implies  that  the  validity  of  our  instrument  can  be  only 
specified on logical grounds (Table 6, columns 4-6). 
 
Results from the first stage of the IV estimate show that o ur instrument is highly 
relevant since it has a strong impact on the instrumented variable  in the first stage 
equation. To evaluate the significance of  the  instrument even in  the  presence of 
weakness we perform the Anderson–Rubin (1949) Wald test. The test is robust to the 
presence of weak instruments when the sample size is large and its null hypothesis 
assumes that the coefficient of the endogenous regressor in the structural equation is 
equal to zero. Test results lead us to reject the null that the coefficient on the intrinsic 
motivation indicator is zero at 1 percent. We finally observe that the instrumented 
variable is significant in second stage estimates for all of the three specifications. Note 
as  well  that  in  two  out  of  three  estimates,  the  null  of  exogeneity  of  the  intrinsic 
                                                 
27 Consider that the value zero of the dependent variable includes voluntary movers who do not end up with non higher wages and 
higher life satisfaction and the other two groups of (laid off or resigned) non voluntary movers.     19 
motivation component is not rejected, suggesting that the OLS estimate can also be 
considered  valid,  at  least  conditionally  to  the  chosen  set  of  instruments.  Our 
conclusion is that intrinsic motivations play a crucial role  in explaining why movers 





The  literature  on  wage  differentials  measures  the  effect  of  pecuniary  and  non 
pecuniary job characteristics on workers‟ utility by looking at wage determinants and 
wage differentials through the lenses of labour market theories. In this perspective, in 
non  segmented  labour  markets  and  in  the  presence  of  job  vacancies  in  the  profit 
industry, individuals may accept lower wages in equilibrium without moving from the 
low to the high wage sectors if non pecuniary compensating differentials offset the 
negative  difference  in  remunerations.  The  presence  of  intrinsic  motivations  may 
deepen the wage differential if not-for-profit jobs satisfy them relatively more than for 
profit jobs. Our findings confirm that the compensating differential hypothesis is part 
of  the  explanation  of  the  profit/not-for-profit  wage  differentials  since  we  identify  a 
group  of  voluntary  movers  who  change,  resulting  in  a  non  higher  wage  and 
experience higher job satisfaction after the change. 
 
The inquiry of the characteristics and relative preferences of this group of workers 
helps us identify what compensates for them. We find that the latter is relatively more 
intrinsically motivated than the rest of movers and the majority of them identify a 
series  of  non  pecuniary  compensations  (an  improvement  in  time  flexibility,  more 
consistency with ones‟ own education, better relationships with stakeholders) when 
comparing the new versus the old job. 
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